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AVIATION-THE NEED FOR UNIFORM
LEGISLATION
JOHN J. KENNELLY*
A t the outset, it should be noted that the title of this article
does not speak of the need for "federal" legislation, but
rather the need for "uniform" legislation in regard to the
rights of claimants and the rights and duties of defendants
arising out of airplane accidents. The passage of uniform leg-
islation can best be achieved through the implementation of
traditional methods to obtain state enacted legislation,
namely by utilizing the National Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Attempts by Congress to enact comprehensive
and fair legislation have been fruitless.
I. THE NEED FOR UNIFORM LEGISLATION
There is need for uniformity in the law pertaining to cases
arising out of aviation accidents. In regard to the compensa-
tory damages in wrongful death cases, the statutes of some
states permit damages for the mental pain and suffering of
the surviving next of kin, whereas others do not.1 Some states
permit damages for the loss of society, companionship, ser-
vices and consortium to the surviving spouse.' Still other
*John J. Kennelly of Chicago, Illinois has served as Chairman (1981-82), of the
Aviation and Space Law Committee of the Torts and Insurance Practice Section of
the American Bar Association, and he is a former chairman of the Aviation Section.
Mr. Kennelly is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Interna-
tional Society of Barristers. He authored Litigation and Trial of Air Crash Cases.
' See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906 (1979), W.VA. CODE § 55-7:6 (Supp. 1982). But
See N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUsT LAW § 5-4, 3 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
3 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT § 537.090 (Vernon Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1053(B) (West Supp. 1982-83).
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states permit damages for pre-death pain and suffering, while
others do not.3 Some states permit damages for loss of inheri-
tance, yet others do not.' Some states permit punitive dam-
ages in both injury and death cases, while still others permit
such damages in injury cases, but not in death cases.5 Some
states allow punitive damages based upon vicarious liability.'
Others require proof of egregious conduct of a corporation at
a managerial level.7 Some states impose an arbitrary amount
of damages for the deaths of single persons without depen-
dents.3 Some states allow prejudgment interest, i.e., interest
from the date of death. Even as to those states which allow
3 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. J 537.095 (Vernon Supp. 1983), TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art 4677 (Vernon 1942).
' For a listing of states that do permit damges for loss of inheritance, see L. KREIN-
DLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 13.04 [31, at 13-30 (1982).
6 See generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIERCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
(1980 & Supp. 1981).
' See generally 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 257 (1965 & Supp 1982). See, e.g. Pull-
man v. Hall, 46 F.2d 399 (1931)(in dicta the court stated that ratification and authori-
zation are necessary to find liability, unless is common carrier); Parson v. Weinstein
Enterprises Inc., 387 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. App. 1980) (punitive liability regardless of fact
that employer did not know of, or ratify, assault by employee); Ford Motor Credit
Corp. v. Johns, 269 So. 2d 54 (1972) (punitive damages against company, even when
employee's assault liability did not impose punitive damages against employee);
Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E. 2d 761 (1968) (corporate
liability for punitive damage for agent's willful, wanton, and malicious assault against
plaintiff); Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W. 2d 293 (1948) (punitive damages against em-
ployer for employee's reckless driving even where employer did not authorize, ratify
or have knowledge of act).
Id. at §§ 260-61; See, e.g. Doralee Estates Inc. v. Cities Services Oil Co., 569 F.2d
716 (2d Cir. 1977) (where management knew of oil spill and failed to respond, puni-
tive damages were proper on finding of negligence); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616
S.W. 2d 911 (Tex. 1981) (company liable for punitive damages where district manager
acted negligently. Court found company acted with "conscious indifference");
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E. 2d 568
(1981)(test drive accident by negligent retailer could be linked to advertizing of man-
ufacturer which was of such a degree that punitive damages against manufacturer
proper); Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Marvin Riggs Co., 584 S.W. 2d 863 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) (gross negligence in hiring attributed to company after truck driver acted
negligently, resulting in company's liability for punitive damages).
I Id. at § 28; See, e.g., Illinois Annot. Stat. Ch. 70 § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959); Colorado
Revised Stat. § 13-21-203 (1974).
SId. at § 275; See, e.g. 16 A.L.R. Fed 679, 699 § 12 (1973) (cases allowing prejudg-
ment interest in federal courts); 92 A.L.R. Fed. 679, 699 § G (1973) (cases allowing
pre-judgement interest in state courts); 92 A.L.R. 2d 1104, 1115-17 § 6-7(a) (1964)
(cases allowing prejudgment interest in state courts).
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prejudgment interest, the rates of such interest vary
substantially. 10
There are other patently indefensible differences among the
laws of the states regarding damages in wrongful death
cases.11 Under Florida law, for example, which permits dam-
ages for mental pain and suffering of next of kin, an award of
$1.8 million in damages was affirmed for the death of a 16-
year-old boy, as a result of the crash of a commercial air-
liner." Indiana law, on the other hand, limits the damages in
such a case to funeral expenses and nominal costs for ad-
ministering the estate." This hardly is consonant with com-
mon sense or with anyone's concept of justice.
The determination of what law applies in regard to compen-
satory damages arising out of airplane accidents and many
other types of occurrences, in itself, presents threshold issues,
the resolution of which is not predictable by even the most
experienced and knowledgeable lawyers and judges. Federal
courts have jurisdiction over aviation litigation only on the
basis of diversity of citizenship,1 4 except in suits which involve
the United States government as a defendant.1 5 Possibly in
part for that reason, federal courts hearing this type of litiga-
tion, rather than employing "federal law" (if there is such a
thing) so as to provide equal justice for all parties, usually ad-
here inflexibly to Justice Frankfurter's statement in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York," a leading Erie-type1 7 case decided thirty-
five years ago, which held that a federal court adjudicating
state-created rights in diversity cases "is, for that purpose, in
effect only another court of the State."18 Adherence to this
rule leads to serious problems because a federal court, by at-
1I Id.
" See, e.g., infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; See also Kennelly, Proving
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 1975 TmAL LAW. GuIDE 25-27.
" Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So.2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971).
" IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1982).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
Id. at § 1346(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
i7 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 108. (emphasis added).
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tempting to determine what "outcome-determinative" 19 law
applies to different issues in this type of litigation, is required
to adopt the choice-of-law rules of each of the various states
where suits before it were originally filed, whether they were
filed in state court and removed to federal court, or whether
they were originally filed in federal court.2 0
These problems are accentuated because states have signifi-
cantly different choice-of-law doctrines.21 Within the confines
of this article, it is impossible to review the choice-of-law doc-
trines of each of the fifty states, much less of the various terri-
tories of the United States. Suffice it to say that there is a
wide divergence of criteria employed by the various state and
territorial courts when making a determination of what par-
ticular law should apply in a particular case.
Some courts apply inflexibly the doctrine of lex loci
delicti.2 Other states adopt various types of "interest" doc-
trines in determining what law applies to particular issues.2 8
Obviously, the present system does not permit uniform treat-
ment of the families of passenger-victims or of defendants. A
claimant may have a viable claim for punitive damages
against one of several defendants simply because that particu-
lar claimant filed suit in a state whose choice-of-law doctrine
mandates the application of the law of a state which permits
claims for punitive damages as to that defendant." Another
claimant, whose claim arose out of the same occurrence, may
be precluded from claiming punitive damages as to the identi-
cal defendant simply because he filed suit in a different state
with a different choice-of-law doctrine.2 5 Delay and uncer-
I Id.
2o Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW (3d ed. 1977).
Id. at § 132.
'3 Id. at § 92; cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d .473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1965) (holding that justice may best be achieved in tort cases with multi-state
contracts by giving controlling effect to the laws of the jurisdiction which has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation).
" See J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES 36-46 (1968); Ken-
nelly, Aviation Law: Domestic Air Travel-A Brief Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56 CHI.
B. REC. 248, 267-68 (1975).
15 J. KENNELLY, LMGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES 36-46 (1968).
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tainty are thus inevitable in resolving threshold issues as to
what "outcome-determinative" state law is to be applied to
particular issues in each case, regardless of the ability, dili-
gence and dedication of judges and lawyers.
Adding to the problems involved in determining what law
applies as to the rights of claimants and to the obligations of
defendants, not only to claimants but vis-i-vis one another, is
the so-called depecage method of choosing the law which ap-
plies to particular issues in litigation. Depecage is an ill-de-
fined, high-sounding clich6 which permits the court to apply
the laws of different states to different issues in the same liti-
gation, based upon uncertain, ambiguous, and unpredictable
criteria.2 In the real world of litigation, depecage simply al-
lows judges to apply the law of whatever state they want to in
regard to any and all issues.
Professor Reese states:
Amidst the chaos and tumult of law there is at least one point
on which there seems to be general agreement in the United
States. This is that choice of the applicable law should fre-
quently depend upon the issue involved. The search in these
instances is not for the state whose law will be applied to gov-
ern all issues in a case; rather it is for the rule of law that can
most appropriately be applied to govern the particular
issue....
It also seems probable that the greater use of depecage will be
an inevitable by-product of the development of satisfactory
rules of choice of law. In contrast to the broad rules that have
been tried and found wanting, the new rules, if we are indeed
to develop such rules, are likely to be narrow in scope and large
in number....
In short, a willingness to make a liberal use of depecage would
seem a prerequisite to the satisfactory development of narrow
rules of choice of law.2 7
Consider the words "the rule of law that can most appropri-
ately be applied to govern the particular issue." What is
' See generally Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 58.(1973).
17 Id. at 58-60.
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"most appropriate"? How is the determination to be made? Is
this to be a subjective determination based upon the predilec-
tions and prejudices of judges? How are lawyers going to ad-
vise and counsel their clients? These are some of the difficult
questions which the use of depecage presents.
The litigation arising out of the crash of American Airlines'
Flight 191 at O'Hare International Airport on May 25, 1979,
involving a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 illustrates the absurdi-
ties which ensue from the ivory tower choice-of-law principle
called depecage. On May 25, 1979, at 3:04:05 p.m. Chicago
time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Series 10 jet transport, op-
erated by American Airlines as Flight 191, crashed shortly af-
ter takeoff into an open field and trailer park about 4,600 feet
northwest of the departure end of Runway 32R1 at O'Hare
International Airport." The left engine and related structures
fell off the aircraft during its takeoff roll8 0 Initially, the air-
craft climbed away from the runway in a wings-level atti-
tude,8" but shortly thereafter it rolled into a steep left bank,
descended rapidly, and crashed." The impact occurred one
minute and twenty seconds after the takeoff roll had begun. 8
The aircraft carried 258 passengers and 13 crewmembers, all
of whom were killed. 4 Additionally, on the ground, two peo-
ple were killed and two were injured. 5
This was the fourth worst air disaster in world history, and
the worst ever in the United States." Congress and the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, realizing the need for a
" Runway numbering corresponds to the magnetic heading of the runway to the
nearest ten degrees on the compass rose; thus, an aircraft landing or taking off on
Runway 32 would be flying at a heading of approximately 320 degrees. The letter "r"
signifies the Runway 32R is the right of two parallel runways.
11 NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., DC-10-10,
N110AA, CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, May 25, 1979, at 1-2. [hereinafter
cited as ACCIDENT REPORT].
30 Id. at 2.
3' Id. "Attitude" refers to the relationship between the aircraft's axis and the hori-
zon, i.e., whether the nose is up or down and whether the wings are level or banked.




36 TIME, June 4, 1979, at 12.
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prompt and thorough inquiry, initiated a massive investiga-
tion. 3 7 Only twelve days after the accident, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration suspended the Type Certificate for the
McDonnell Douglas DC-10, 8 thus grounding all DC-10s oper-
ated by U.S. carriers until the Type Certificate was reinstated
on July 13, 1979.39
The apparent structural failure of a modern jetliner caused
reverberations throughout the world. Hundreds of DC-10s
carrying thousands of passengers were being flown millions of
miles each day by scores of domestic and international air-
lines. This accident took place in normal weather.40 There
could be no contention of low-level wind shear, vortex turbu-
lence, sabotage or any other outside cause. If there was a fatal
flaw in the design of the wing pylons which supported the en-
gines, there would indeed be cause for alarm. If the cause of
the pylon fracture and failure could be attributed to improper
maintenance, and design defect ruled out, remedial inspection
measures would be sufficient to allay the fears of the flying
public.
The alleged egregious conduct of the defendants, the airline
and the manufacturer took place in multiple states. The air-
line and the manufacturer were incorporated in and had their
principal places of business in different states, and the acci-
dent occurred in Illinois. 1
All federal court litigation, regardless of where the suits
were filed, was assigned by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel,
pursuant to the Multidistrict Litigation Act, to United
States Court Judges Edwin A. Robson and Hubert L. Will,
both seasoned experts in the area of multidistrict litigation for
coordinated pretrial discovery. 3 Approximately 118 cases en-
37 See generally ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 29.
" Id. at 89-97.
89 Id.
40 Id. at 3.
"I In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 604-05
(7th Cir. 1981).
41 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
' In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp. 1044,
1047 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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ded up in various federal courts throughout the country."
About seventy-five cases were filed in the state courts of Cali-
fornia. Thus, there was parallel litigation arising out of a sin-
gle occurrence in both federal and state courts.
This complex litigation posed a myriad of questions. From
the standpoint of the families of the deceased passengers,
what were their rights? Did the state court plaintiffs have dif-
ferent rights than the federal court plaintiffs? Was considera-
tion of such outcome-determinative issues as the admissibility
of income taxes in regard to deceased passengers' past and
prospective earnings inadmissible in state court cases, but ad-
missible in federal court cases? What judicial system would
resolve their rights? What laws governed the various issues?
The passengers were from various states of the United States
and from several foreign countries.5 Some plaintiffs also sued
for punitive damages. American Airlines and McDonnell
Douglas tendered stipulations to all plaintiffs whereby they
agreed not to contest liability for compensatory damages, con-
ditioned, however, upon a waiver of any claim for punitive
damages."
The courts, therefore, were confronted with a threshold is-
sue-what law applied in reference to the right of plaintiffs to
claim punitive damages in the wrongful death cases as to each
of the defendants. Suits had been filed in various states, prin-
cipally in Illinois, California and New York.'7 Some suits were
filed in Puerto Rico.48 The district court had to decide what
law in regard to the punitive damage issue applied in each
" 644 F.2d at 604.
500 F. Supp. at 1047.
'* American Airlines and McDonnell Douglas offered a stipulation to all plaintiffs
whose cases were pending in both state and federal courts. The stipulation provided
that those defendants would not contest liability for reasonable compensatory dam-
ages conditioned upon a waiver by plaintiffs for claims of punitive damages. See, In
re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1286-87
(N.D. 11. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d
633 (7th Cir. 1981). The lead counsel for plaintiff, is not aware of any case in which
the stipulation was rejected.
,1 644 F.2d at 604.
44 Id.
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case as to each defendant.4 There were different choice-of-law
doctrines in each of the states and also in Puerto Rico.60 Dis-
trict Court Judges Robson and Will could not, with intellec-
tual honesty, simply gloss over the significant differences in
the applicable choice-of-law doctrines and rationalize a pre-
ordained decision which would be palatable, pleasant, and
plausible so as to achieve a uniform result as to all plaintiffs
and all defendants, regardless of where they filed suit. These
able judges decried the ridiculousness of the system, but law-
yer-like, carried out their obligation to apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state where each suit was filed. 1 Judges Robson
and Will expressed their chagrin with the state of the law and
the need for uniform legislation.52 Judge Will pointed out that
while he and Judge Robson would have liked to achieve a uni-
form result as to all plaintiffs and defendants, they were
obliged to apply the varying choice-of-law doctrines of differ-
ent states to different cases, depending upon where each suit
had been filed."'
In determining what law applied as to the punitive damage
issue, the United States District Court thus had to consider
the choice-of-law rules of Illinois, California, New York and
Puerto Rico. Illinois uses the "most significant relationship"
test.54 California follows a "comparative impairment" ap-
proach"5 under which the court must determine which state's
policy, as reflected by its law, would be more severely affected
if it were not applied.56 New York applies a "governmental
interest" approach, 7 and Puerto Rico employs the traditional
40 500 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
"o Id. at 1047-52.
81 Id. at 1054.
88 Id.
I8 d.
In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp 1044,
1048 (N.D. Ill. 1980), affd, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 321, 546 P.2d 719, 724, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, 220 (1976).
-Id. 16 Cal.3d 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
87 500 F. Supp. at 1051; see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 179,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1923).
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lex loci delicti doctrine."
At the time of the occurrence, McDonnell Douglas had its
principal place of business in Missouri," and American Air-
lines, in New York. 0 Missouri law authorizes punitive damage
claims in wrongful death cases," whereas New York does
not." Illinois, the place of the occurrence, probably does not
allow punitive damages as to cases brought under its wrongful
death statute"8 although Illinois permits punitive damages in
survival actions."' Applying the choice-of-law doctrines of Illi-
nois, California and New York to the suits filed in those
states, the district court concluded that the law of the princi-
pal place of business of each defendant applied as to that de-
fendant. 5 The suits filed in Puerto Rico required application
of the lex loci delicti rule, making Illinois law applicable.6 "
500 F. Supp. at 1052.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1049.
41 Id. at 1050. Missouri does not allow punitive damages per se. It allows the jury
to consider aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances attending the death. If
aggravating circumstances are found, additional damages can be assessed although
they are not characterized as punitive damages. Id.
" Id. at 1052. New York choice-of-law doctrine applies the law of the principal
place of business to determine if punitive damages will be awarded. Id.
" Id. at 1048-50.
" See McEwen v.Walsh, 96 Ill. App. 2d 326,238 N.E.2d 616 (1968); Madison v.
Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958).
500 F. Supp. at 1048-52.
Id. at 1052. In determining that McDonnell Douglas was subject to punitive
damages, but American Airlines was not, Judges Robson and Will recognized the in-
congruity of the law in this regard, which required them to apply varying choice of
law to different issues in the same case. Judge Will forthrightly stated that his opin-
ion was "incongruous":
The bottom line is, it is inconsistent, incongruous and crazy, but that
is the way the conflicts of laws rules work. And you can take this opin-
ion and I think you will have very great difficulty - we tried, let me
tell you very hard, Judge Robson, our law clerks, and all of our law
clerks, to figure out some way to get a uniform result and still not do
violence to what we conceive to be intellectual honesty in the responsi-
bility of a judge to apply the law as it appears under this federal sys-
tem under which we operate. Nobody here is happy to reach this kind
of incongruous result . . . You will see how we came up with what I
think is compelled by the current state of law, but which I am the first
to concede and Judge Robson and I are the first two people to concede
is something less than ideal.
In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979 Transcript of Proceedings,
May 23, 1980, at 8.
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As to all cases filed in Illinois, California or New York: (a)
American Airlines was exempt from claims for punitive dam-
ages as to all plaintiffs because it was allegedly based princi-
pally in New York on the date of the occurrence, and New
York law does not allow punitive damages in wrongful death
cases;67 (b) McDonnell Douglas was subject to claims for puni-
tive damages in all cases filed in Illinois, California and New
York because its principal place of business on the date of the
accident was in Missouri, and Missouri allows punitive dam-
age claims in wrongful death cases; 8 (c) as to all cases filed in
Puerto Rico, neither defendant was subject to claims for puni-
tive damages. 9
While these rulings may at first blush appear to be paradox-
ical and inexplicable, Judges Robson and Will did not attempt
to reach a preordained, palatable ruling which would treat all
plaintiffs and both defendants alike. Instead, while recogniz-
ing the indefensibility of the state of the law in regard to
choice-of-law doctrines, they reached a decision which, while
not resulting in a uniform finding as to all claimants and de-
fendants, was in their opinion required by the applicable
choice-of-law rules of California, New York, Illinois, and Pu-
erto Rico.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded otherwise, however, and ruled that the law of Illi-
nois, the place of the accident, applied as to all cases and both
defendants regardless of where they were filed.70 All plaintiffs
accordingly were precluded from claiming punitive damages
as to both defendants. 7 1 The Seventh Circuit thus reached a
more palatable and uniform result than the district court. In
doing so, the court ruled that neither the substantive law of
the state where the principal place of business of the respec-
tive defendants was located, nor the law of the state wherein
the alleged egregious conduct of the defendants took place,
e 500 F. Supp. at 1049-51.
Id. at 1050-52.
6 Id. at 1052.
70 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 616
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
71 644 F.2d at 617.
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was controlling.7
The court of appeals ably reviewed the complexity of the
law in regard to choice of law, and in doing so interpreted all
applicable choice-of-law doctrines so as to apply the law of
Illinois, where the accident occurred, as to the punitive dam-
ages issue.78 The court of appeals approved the District
Judges Robson and Will's calling for legislative action to re-
lieve litigants, lawyers and the courts from the problems ema-
nating from the lack of uniformity of state legislation and
state choice-of-law doctrines. 4 The court emphasized the
need to provide uniformity of treatment of plaintiffs and de-
fendants in this type of litigation."
In litigation growing out of the Pago Pago air crash of Janu-
ary 30, 1974,1 in which Pan American, Boeing and the United
States were defendants, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on October 2, 1982, construed the California choice-of-
law doctrine as requiring the application of the law of the
state where a defendant has its principal place of business in
regard to that defendant's liability.77 The court concluded
that the law of Washington controlled in regard to the liabil-
ity of Boeing.7
These real-life examples of the chaos caused by the varying
choice-of-law doctrines of the more than fifty states and terri-
tories of the United States, and the so called depecage doc-
trine, emphasize the need for legislation which will apply uni-
form laws to all claimants and all defendants. The problem is
how to achieve comprehensive and just uniform legislation.
The inadequate achievements of federal legislators over a pe-
riod of fifteen years make it apparent that the only way to
achieve such needed legislation is through the auspices of the
" Id. at 633.
I ld. at 632-33. The choice-of-law analysis of the court of appeals was attacked in
a petition for certiorari which was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 454
U.S. 878 (1981).
14 644 F.2d at 732-33.
76 Id. at 633.
16 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Pago Pago on Jan. 30, 1974, 692 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.
1981).
17 What Law Applies, 26 TR. LAw GUIDE 450, 450-54 (1982).
78 Id.
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National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This may
take longer, but the delay will be worthwhile. These commis-
sioners will make an in-depth study of all of the problems
with regard to all types of aviation accident claims and litiga-
tion, utilize the expertise of the industry and its representa-
tives, and finalize legislation which will be comprehensive and
just.
I have set forth only a few of the problems which courts and
lawyers face in aviation litigation. The Chicago, Illinois and
Pago Pago cases illustrate that the law of the United States
relating to transitory tort litigation arising out of airplane
crashes is marked by mystery, confusion, and inconsistency.
Lawyers and judges have attempted pragmatic approaches to
litigation arising out of such disasters so as to achieve some
degree of consistency in order to provide a semblance of jus-
tice. The results are largely cosmetic. Claimants continue to
be treated in vastly different ways. Defendants are also
treated differently depending upon where the suit is filed,
where the accident occurs, where the defendant's principal
place of business is located, where the egregious conduct took
place, and other varying factors.
The American Airlines Flight 191 litigation79 worked out
well, due in large part to the experience and wisdom of the
federal judges to whom the cases were assigned. They did eve-
rything within the system to expedite and fairly resolve the
cases. Discovery was completed as to liability within approxi-
mately two years, which was in itself a considerable accom-
plishment.80 Discovery as to damages was also completed in
all the federal court suits except for a small number filed
shortly before the expiration of the Illinois statute of limita-
tions.81 A considerable number of these cases have been set-
tled, and the plaintiffs have had the benefit of substantial cu-
79 See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
80 See, In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 480 F.
Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
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mulative interest.8 2 The district and appellate court judges
utilized every procedure permitted by the system to resolve
the litigation as expeditiously as possible. 8 Three interlocu-
tory appeals were required, however, merely to obtain final
rulings as to significant threshold issues. These issues in-
cluded what law applied in regard to punitive damages and
prejudgment interest, and the effect of the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Railway
Co. v. Liepelt,8 4 relating to the propriety of proof of the effect
of income taxes upon earnings with regard to damages.85
The resolution of outcome-determinative threshold issues at
the trial and appellate levels consumes time. Obviously, these
issues must be decided before a trial takes place. In addition,
the resolution of the liability issue may be prolonged by a bat-
tle between the defendants as to their rights and liabilities
vis-A-vis contribution. Some air crash litigation has taken al-
most a decade to complete.86
In addition to these problems, there is another serious ob-
stacle to the achievement of justice in air crash litigation. It is
caused by adherence to the myth that each state of the
United States is a separate sovereign and that because of this,
a defendant may not be sued within any particular state, even
if an accident occurs in that state, unless there exist "mini-
mum contacts" between the defendant and the forum state
consistent with "traditional concepts of fair play and substan-
tial justice. '87 The problem with the "minimum contacts" test
for in personam jurisdiction is that neither case law or state
statutes provide the practitioner with a definitive rule of ap-
plication.88 Consequently, the present system sometimes re-
sults in the necessity to sue multiple defendants in multiple
82 Id.
8I Id.
444 U.S. 490 (1980).
s' Id. at 493-94.
66 Speech by Robert Alpert, Vice President of United States Aviation Insurance
Group, International Law Seminar sponsored by Lloyd's Press in Tobago (March,
1981) (obtainable from Lloyd's Press, London).
87 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
81 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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states. Even worse, the present system also leads to parallel
litigation, arising out of the same aircraft accident, in various
state and federal courts.
II. HISTORY OF PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Federal legislation was first proposed in regard to major avi-
ation accidents in 1967 by Senator Tydings of Maryland.
Three bills were introduced,89 which, briefly stated, provided
for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over several
types of actions involving common carriers, aircraft having a
seating capacity of ten or more persons, and crashes resulting
in the death or injury of five or more persons. State courts
would retain jurisdiction over all other types of cases arising
out of aviation accidents. These bills adopted the then tradi-
tional contributory negligence doctrine that a plaintiff was
completely barred if negligent at all. Provisions were made for
contribution among defendant-tortfeasors on the basis of
comparative negligence. These bills were never enacted. As is
later pointed out, these bills failed to address many of the se-
rious problems involved in aviation accident litigation.
In 1978, Representative Danielson of California introduced
a bill known as H.R. 10917.90 This bill contained many of the
same deficiencies of those proposed by Senator Tydings. It
also was not enacted.
A. Pending Legislation: H.R. 1027
In 1981, H.R. 1027 was introduced by Representative Dan-
ielson and other Congresspersons.91 Public hearings have been
held by the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, whose chairman
is Representative Hill of Texas. H.R. 1027 has substantially
the same deficiencies as the prior proposed legislation.2 This
statute also fails to address, let alone solve, many of the
problems which burden lawyers and judges in regard to avia-
so S. 3305, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 3306, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.
4089, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
H.R. 10917, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
' H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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tion claims and litigation. The criteria as to compensatory
damages, "fair and just compensation for pecuniary losses,"
fails to define what is meant by those generic words.9' This
would lead to years of appeals simply to determine their
meaning.
Also, there is no mention in the bill regarding punitive dam-
ages. Does this mean that punitive damages would not be re-
coverable, regardless of the extent of egregious conduct of a
particular defendant? The answer probably is in the affirma-
tive. 4 There is no sense in eliminating claims for punitive
damages arising out of those aviation accidents which result in
five or more persons being killed, 5 while allowing claims for
punitive damages arising out of other aviation accidents in
which four or fewer persons were killed. This is but one in-
defensible absurdity contained in H.R. 1027; others are noted
subsequently.
Section 1364, regarding jurisdiciton, provides:
(a) The district courts, concurrently with state courts, shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action which-





(D) common carrier aircraft;
(2) arises out of a transaction or occurrence in the course
of aviation activity which results in the death of five or
more persons;
(3) arises under chapter 174 of this title and is on a claim
the liability for which is indemnified in whole or in part
by the United States; or
(4) arises out of a transaction or occurrence which gives
rise to an action of which the district courts otherwise
have jurisdiction under section 1346(b) of this chapter,
and to which chapter 174 of this title is applicable.
H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2752(d) (1981).
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, on remand, 578 F.2d 565
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978).
H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1364(a)(2) (1981).
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(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under chapter 174 of this
title shall be vested in state courts."
Section 1452 provides:
Removal of actions arising out of aviation activity:
(a) Any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion under section 1364 of this title may be removed by
any party to the action to the the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
(b)(1) In removals under this section, removal is effective
whether or not coparties join therein, section 1441 of this
chapter does not apply, no bond shall be required, and
time for removal is as follows:
(A) by any defendant, as provided in section 1446(b) of
this chapter;
(B) by any party other than a defendant, a petition for
removal may be filed not later than thirty days after be-
coming or being made a party; and
(C) if the action arises out of the sarpe occurrence as ac-
tions pending in district courts and the Judicial Panel on
Mulitidistrict Litigation under section 1407 and 1408 of
this title has ordered coordinated or consolidated pro-
ceedings in such actions, the time for removal commences
anew on the date of the order of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and a petition for removal by any
party may be filed not later than thirty days after the
date of the order.
(2) Except as provided above, procedures for removal
under section 1446-1450 of this chapter apply.97
The statute does not address serious problems in regard to
the doctrines of estoppel by verdict and res judicata. If a
plaintiff's suit is removed to the federal court and thereafter
"multidistricted,"" the plaintiff, unlike in class action litiga-
" Id. at § 1364.
" Id. at § 1452.
*8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in several different federal district courts, such actions
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tion, has no right to "opt out."99 The pendency of parallel liti-
gation growing out of a single air crash in both state and fed-
eral courts leads to the absurd situation where those who act
expeditiously can be severely penalized. If the first case is
tried in the state court and that trial results in a defense ver-
dict, the plaintiffs in the federal court are not bound by that
verdict. On the other hand, if the federal court tries the liabil-
ity issue first and a defense verdict is rendered, the state court
cases are not bound by that federal court defense verdict.100
It is axiomatic that one who might be affected by a trial has
the right to be present in person and to be represented by
counsel of his choosing.10 ' No person has the right to appear
as another's attorney without authority from the client.102
How are the courts going to reconcile these fundamental con-
stitutional rights of litigants with the preemption of such liti-
gants and their attorneys by a plaintiffs' committee or "lead
counsel"?
H.R. 1027 contains no provision for the allowance of pre-
judgment interest; thus it attmepts to nullify the prejudgment
interest statutes of fourteen states as to only those claims
coming within its restricted provisions. Fourteen states have
seen fit to enact prejudgment interest legislation. 03 Thus,
some families of victims of airplane accidents will receive pre-
judgment interest, but others will not. Fair-minded persons
must conclude that unless reasonable prejudgment interest is
provided, victims and their families will suffer enormous eco-
nomic losses. The enactment of H.R. 1027 will not remedy the
inevitable delays which are inherent in the system, and in
consequence, claimants will suffer. While they wait for the
may be transferred to one district for coordinated and consolidated management and
trial under a single judge. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (5th ed. 1979).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
100 O'Connor & Kukankos, Estoppel by Verdict, The Multidistrict Litigation Act,
and Constitutional Rights of Litigants-Can They Coexist?, 20 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
249 (1976).
101 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 842 (1979).
101 The Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315 (1927). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2d
Attorneys At Law § 133 (1979).
103 Fleming, Prejudgment Interest: An Element of Full Compensation in Wrong-
ful Death Cases, 1981 U. ILL. L. F. 453, 474-75.
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resolution of liability, they will be deprived of substantial cu-
mulative interest, which over a period of several years can
often equal the total damages. There are many aviation cases
in which the liability of at least one of the defendants is un-
questionable. In other words, the facts in the case are such
that no court would permit a defense verdict in favor of all
defendants. The plaintiffs have no interest in how the defen-
dants' liabilities are allocated. The only genuine liability issue
in most commercial accident cases involves the extent of the
liability of the various defendants in terms of their compara-
tive negligence vis-A-vis one another. There has never been a
commercial airplane case in which the contributory negligence
of passengers was an issue.
There is no reason why plaintiffs, usually the families of in-
nocent passenger-victims, should be utilized as vehicles in or-
der to accommodate the defendants in regard to their interne-
cine disputes. H.R. 1027 not only will not expedite the
dispostion of claims, but will encourage the protraction of liti-
gation although there is no genuine issue as to liability of at
least one adequately insured defendant. The mere fact that a
large number of passengers are killed does not make litigation
complicated. It has become an unfortunate practice on the
part of plaintiffs' committees to engage in extensive, unneces-
sary discovery in cases where there is no genuine issue as to
the liability of at least one defendant, usually, but not always,
the common carrier.
Although the American College of Trial Lawyers encourages
the use of summary judgment motions, summary judgment
procedures are rarely implemented in aviation accident litiga-
tion. Knowledgeable aviation litigation lawyers and judges
have become all too familiar with saturation techniques em-
ployed in regard to discovery. Privately, many lawyers and
judges are concerned that depositions are taken which inevita-
bly degenerate into a mish-mash of thousands of pages of tes-
timony, usually speculative and conjectural in nature. Such
depositions not only do not help in resolving the litigation,
but often result in making a comparatively simply case
complicated.
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H.R. 1027 will have no effect upon the great majority of
general aviation accidents, thus resulting in grossly disparate
treatment of plaintiffs and defendants based upon such illogi-
cal and senseless considerations as the number of persons
killed in an accident, whether the aircraft is "large" or
"small," whether the aircraft is "high" performance or "low"
performance, whether the aircraft is a "public" aircraft, and
whether it is a "common carrier" aircraft.10 4 One would think
that Congress would be concerned with the rights of the pas-
senger public, particularly in regard to all common carriers of
passengers by air. Instead, the proposed statute grants enor-
mous preferential treatment to major common carriers. It
leaves open too much greater exposure (including claims for
punitive damages, prejudgment interest, damages for pre-
death pain and suffering, loss to children of parental care and
guidance, loss of consortium of surviving spouses, mental pain
and suffering of survivors) all other segments of the aircraft
industry, including general aviation manufacturers, makers of
their components, fixed base operators, repair stations, fuel
suppliers, corporate owners of aircraft, and the over one mil-
lion general aviation pilots in this country. Why should gen-
eral aviation pilots be subjected to much greater exposure
than major airlines? One would think Congress would be more
concerned with the pilots' problem than those of a few trunk
airlines. One of this country's leading aviation lawyers, James
M. FitzSimons, has forthrightly and accurately pointed out
that: "It is conceivable that the passage of the Bill [H.R.
1027] could result in the anomaly of two separate and distinct
bodies of law for aviation accidents-one for large accidents,
and one for small accidents."105
The rights of claimants and the rights and duties of defen-
dants in regard to aviation accident litigation should not de-
pend upon the arbitrary, irrational classifications contained in
H.R. 1027. H.R. 1027 is almost a carbon copy of Senator Tyd-
S4 ee H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2741 (1981).
lo Address by James M. FitzSimons, ABA National Institute on Litigation in Avi-
ation and Space Law, in Washington D.C. (May 27-29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
"Address"].
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ings' statutes proposed fifteen years ago. They were discarded
because they made no sense. The proposed cure was worse
than the sickness. The same can be said of H.R. 1027.
B. The Air Travel Protection Act
Another bill which may soon be introduced in Congress has
been appropriately christened as the Air Travel Protection
Act. It does indeed "protect" major airlines and major aircraft
manufacturers. This is a no-fault statute which provides for
the allowance to claimants of very restricted compensatory
damages arising out of major aviation accidents. The statute
will have no application to the vast majority of airplane acci-
dent claims and litigation. In as much as liability is almost
never a genuine issue in accidents involving major airlines
(the only real issue, if there is any issue at all, involves the
claims for contribution or indemnity among the defendants),
nothing is being "given" by the "protection" statute to injured
passengers of the large commercial airlines or to their survi-
vors, if they are killed. Under the guise of giving something,
i.e., concession of liability, this proposed statute severely re-
stricts the rights of injured passengers and the rights of their
heirs, if they are killed in major airline accidents.
The Air Travel Protection Act suffers from many of the
same deficiencies as H.R. 1027. It will have no effect upon
flights involving an aircraft with 30 or fewer seats, 106 or
payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less 10 7 (involving most
commuter flights), private flights,108 military flights,10 9 and
flights involving foreign-owned aircraft or aircraft being oper-
ated in foreign or international air commerce. 10 The only ex-
ceptions will be in those 'rare instances where an aircraft of a
domestic common carrier being operated in domestic air com-
merce is concurrently involved"' (such as a mid-air collision).
:06 Air Travel Protection Act. § § 1401(m)(1), 1402(a).
*7 Id. at § 1401(m)(1)(A).
1Id.
Id. at § 1402(c)(3)(A).
11 Id. at § 1402(a).
1 Id. at § 1402(c).
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In that event, the claims of all victims, including those flying
in commuter, private, military, foreign or international flights,
would be subject to the provisions of the proposed statute. 12
Obviously, this exception will be most rare. This proposed
statute (not yet formally introduced in Congress) adopts an
arbitrary classification of restricted types of airplane acci-
dents, which markedly and unconstitutionally extends enor-
mously preferential treatment to:
(a) owners and operators of "large" aircraft vis-h-vis
"small" aircraft;
(b) large trunk airlines and large aircraft manufacturers vis-
A-vis (1) small or commuter airlines and charter aircraft com-
panies; (2) private (general) aviation aircraft owners; (3) over
one million general (private) aviation pilots; (4) manufactur-
ers of "small" aircraft, "small" actually including aircraft car-
rying as many as thirty passengers; (5) manufacturers of com-
ponent parts of "small" aircraft; (6) fixed base operators; (7)
repair stations; (8) military aircraft manufacturers; (9) last
but by no means least, the United States of America (in real-
ity, the taxpayers of this country). All of these segments of
the aviation industry, which are excluded from the protection
of the Air Travel Protection Act,' will remain exposed to
much larger compensatory damages than the major airlines
and manufacturers, and also to claims for punitive damages.
This "Protection" statute provides that claims will be lim-
ited to pecuniary loss. " " No provisions are made for damages
for the pre-death pain or suffering of the decedent, for pre-
judgment pain and suffering, for the loss to spouses of com-
panionship, society, services and consortium, for the loss to
children of parental care and guidance, or for any of the other
traditional items of damage which have been allowed by the
states throughout the United States for many years.
In addition, presumably by limiting damages to pecuniary
loss, claims for punitive damages will be prohibited,'1 5 regard-
I, ld.
,, Id. at § § 1401(m)(1),(2).
Id. at § 1403.
,1 Id. at § 1403(a)(3).
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less of the nature or extent of the egregious conduct of those
"protected" by the statute, i.e., major airlines and manufac-
turers of large passenger jetliners. " 6 Whether aviation lawyers
usually represent claimants or defendants, they must be con-
cerned with these attempted federal intrusions into tort
claims. If there is to be a "protection" statute applicable to
aircraft accidents, why should it not be applied to all types of
aircraft accidents, to all types of railroad, bus, taxicab and
other common carrier accidents, to all vehicular and other
types of accidents?
James M. FitzSimons has emphasized that he has not taken
a position concerning this proposed statute. However, he has
posed these perceptive questions in regard to the Air Travel
Protection Act:
1. Is the current system so bad that a complete restructuring
and federal takeover is required, or can we first try to make
smaller, admittedly needed changes so as to make the system,
and the people within it, work better; and even in the event of
such massive restructuring and takeover, will the system truly
more meet the needs of the victims of major air disasters?
2. Should a proposal to restructure a significant section of our
tort system-compensation of major aviation accident vic-
tims-be combined in the same Bill with a proposal to protect
the tortfeasors involved?
3. If the proposed Air Travel Protection Act is passed, will it
herald federal takeovers in other tort areas such as asbestos,
Agent Orange, drug and other cases?
4. Is the concern about the availability of adequate private in-
surance at reasonable rates really well founded?11 7
These are forthright inquiries which cannot lightly be disre-
garded. Other leading lawyers and judges have posed ques-
,,6 This author recognizes that not only corporations, but also individuals including
general aviation pilots, have serious problems resulting from the inability to insure
themselves against punitive damages. The point is that this proposed statute arbi-
trarily singles out a very limited segment of the aircraft industry (major airlines and
aircraft manufacturers) for grossly preferential treatment without a rational basis. It
would appear that if protection is to be given, especially in regard to claims for puni-
tive damages, it should be given to the general aviation pilots in this country, rather
than to a few airlines and manufacturers.
7 Address, supra note 105.
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tions regarding the feasibility of any federal intervention in
regard to tort litigation. As to the fourth question presented
by Mr. FitzSimons, there is no problem of major air carriers
and manufacturers of passenger jetliners as to obtaining more
than adequate liability insurance at relatively nominal cost. s
The bottom line is that the Air Travel Protection Act is
well-named. It will indeed protect the major trunk airlines
and major aircraft manufacturers to the detriment of the pas-
senger public, the taxpayers of the United States, and of all
excluded segments of the aviation industry. Consideration of
H.R. 1027 and the so-called "Air Travel Protection Act" leads
to the conclusion that the need for uniform legislation in re-
gard to aviation accidents (or any other types of accidents)
should not be entrusted to the Congress of the United States.
C. "Federal Law" Cannot Be Implemented So As To
Achieve Uniformity In All Types of Aviation Litigation
It is an illusion that "federal common law" may be utilized
in federal court so as to achieve uniformity as to plaintiffs and
defendants in regard to litigation arising out of aviation acci-
dents. In the first place, under the present system, many cases
arising out of aviation accidents must be instituted in state
courts because of the lack of federal diversity jurisdiction.I 9
State courts, of course, may not employ "federal common
law." Furthermore, the law is clear that federal courts must
apply state law as to all "outcome-determinative" issues.120
There is no way that the federal courts can achieve uniform
treatment of claimants or defendants in litigation growing out
of aviation accidents in the absence of the passage of uniform
legislation."2 '
118 J. Brennan, Comments at the International Law Seminar, in Tobago, British
West Indies (March 16-19, 1981) (Mr. Brennan was president of the United States
Aviation Underwriters).
"' See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
ISO See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 316 U.S. 99 (1945); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
"' See Preweitt, Federal Common Law of Aviation and the Erie Doctrine, 40 J.
AIR L. & COM. 653 (1974) (citing Keeffe & DeValerio, Dallas, Dred Scott and Eyrie
Eire, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 107 (1972) and Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v.
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Although precedent has been established for the creation of
federal common law in air disaster litigation, the federal
courts have not implemented this decision in the last eight
years. In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,"'2 the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals applied a "federal law" in regard to
suits arising out of a mid-air collision between a small aircraft
and a large jet aircraft owned by a national airline. 1 3 The ac-
cident occurred in Indiana.1'4 The jet aircraft was operated by
Allegheny Airlines, and the small aircraft, a Piper' Cherokee,
was operated by a student.1' 5 As a result of the mid-air colli-
sion, both aircraft were totally destroyed and all eighty-three
occupants of the Allegheny airplane were killed."'
Wrongful death actions were commenced on behalf of the
estates of eighty-two of the deceased passengers, the estates of
the three of the four Allegheny crew members, 2 ' and the es-
tate of Robert W. Carey, the student pilot. In addition, prop-
erty damage suits were initiated to recover for the destruction
of both aircraft.12 8 The defendants in the passenger cases
were: Allegheny Airlines; the United States of America; the
estate of Carey, the student pilot; the Brookside Company,
the flying school which owned the aircraft and was instructing
Carey; and Forth Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the Brookside Company. 29 The Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation " assumed jurisdiction over the various ac-
tions commenced outside of Indiana for supervision of the
pretrial discovery.13' Allegheny and the United States settled
Tyson and "The" True National Common Law, 18 Am. U.L. REv. 316 (1968) (federal
common law cannot be applied in aviation disasters until the Supreme Court reviews
the Erie doctrine).
.. 504 F. 2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
I' d. at 403.






1" 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
,31 In re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L.
1970).
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the passenger cases. " 2 They then sought contribution from
Carey's estate, Brookside, and Forth. 33 The district court first
determined that Indiana substantive law was to be applied in
regard to whether the defendants who settled (Allegheny Air-
lines and the United States) had a right to seek contribution
from the defendants who did not settle (the estate of Carey,
Brookside Company and Forth Corporation).' The district
court then granted motions to dismiss the claims of Allegheny
and the United States for contribution, on the basis that Indi-
ana substantive law did not permit claims for contribution
among joint tortfeasors. "'
The court of appeals reversed the district court and ruled
that it was unnecessary to determine what particular state law
applied with respect to the rights of Allegheny and the United
States to claim contribution,'36 and that it also was not neces-
sary to determine whether the district court erred in applying
Indiana law to the issue relating to contribution.3 7 Instead,
the court of appeals held: "We need not reach these issues,
however, for we agree with Allegheny that there should be a
federal law of contribution and indemnity governing mid-air
collisions such as the one here."' 8
The court of appeals thus applied a so-called "federal law,"
which it said was consonant with "sense and justice," and
ruled that in regard to interstate air crash cases it had the
right to apply a federal law as to this particular case (in
which the federal government was a party) independent of
any otherwise applicable law:
The basis for imposing a federal law of contribution and in-
demnity is what we perceive to be the predominant, indeed al-
most exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating
the affairs of the nation's airways. Moreover, the imposition of
a federal rule of contribution and indemnity serves a second
13* Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974).
"3 Id.
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purpose of eliminating inconsistency of result in similar colli-
sion occurrences as well as within the same occurrence due to
the application of differing state laws on contribution and in-
demnity. Given the prevailng federal interest in uniform air
law regulation, we deem it desirable that a federal rule of con-
tribution and indemnity be applied."'' 9
The court emphasized the need to invoke a federal rule of law
so as to achieve "sense and justice" in litigation growing out
of disasters involving interstate major air carriers, where pas-
sengers from multiple states are killed. 140 The court adopted a
"federal law" on the basis of predominant federal interest in
regulating the airways.'" The Seventh Circuit stated that
"[w]ith the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Con-
gress expressed the view that the control of aviation should
rest exclusively in the hands of the federal government.' 142
The court also emphasized that the Kohr litigation had "since
its inception been subject to the supervision of the Judicial
Panel created by the Multidistrict Litigation Act,"""3 and that
"there is no perceptive reason why federal law should not be
applied to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties
involved. "'
In Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,4 5 District Court Judge
Hubert L. Will ruled that the Kohr doctrine did not apply to
actions arising from the crash of a general aviation aircraft, a
Cessna 177 Cardinal, where all of the parties were from Illi-
nois, and the actions involved "a single, non-commercial air-
craft and a wholly intrastate flight, [and where] practically all
the relevant contacts [were] centered in Illinois and [involved]
an area of law, torts, traditionally subject to local control.' 46
In that type of situation, the court held, "the interest of Illi-
nois in applying its own substantive law of indemnity and
139 Id.
140 Id. at 405.
4 Id. at 403. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Minn., 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944).
'" 504 F.2d at 404.
143 Id.
144 Id.
14" 428 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Il1. 1977).
141 Id. at 1288.
1983]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
contribution [was] greater than the federal interest in the
field. 147 The court, however, expressly recognized the need
for the adoption of "federal law" in litigation where interstate
flights of large commercial aircraft are involved, stating:
[W]e recognize that, despite Justice Brandeis' assertion in Erie
that, 'there is no federal general common law,' federal common
law does exist and may even be essential in airline disasters
involving citizens and laws of numerous states. 4"
In litigation growing out of the DC-10 accident at O'Hare Air-
port in Chicago, Illinois, the plaintiffs' committee urged the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to utilize its decision in
Kohr, in which it had said the federal courts could and should
apply federal law so as to achieve "sense and justice" by pro-
viding for uniform treatment of the families of victims.149 It
was undisputed that some of the plaintiffs would receive pre-
judgment interest because some of the passenger-victims re-
sided in states which permitted the allowance of prejudge-
ment interest.150 It did not seem to be consistent with "sense
and justice" for the families of some of the victims to receive
prejudgment interest and others not to receive prejudgment
interest. 1 The court of appeals, however, disregarded this ar-
gument and unequivocally ruled that state law and only state
law applied to air crash litigation.152 In another appeal grow-
ing out of this disaster, involving what law applied in regard
to claims for punitive damages, the court of appeals again
flatly held that state law applied.15 3
The federal courts have not implemented the Kohr deci-
sion. 6 This is not difficult to understand. It would be some-
what inane for federal courts to make "outcome-determina-
tive" rules, on the basis of federal law, which would be
147 Id.
145 Id.
'49 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 11. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633, 637
(7th Cir. 1981).
1 Id. at 639-38.
Is' Id.
Is Id. at 638.
153 Id. at 637.
154 Id.
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markedly different from state court rulings arising out of the
same occurrence. Instead, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized that federal courts are bound by the
Erie doctrine to apply state law if "outcome-determinative,"
but the court did urge legislative action.1 55 In short, there is
no federal common law which can be utilized so as to achieve
uniform treatment of plaintiffs and defendants in regard to
aviation litigation.156 It is unrealistic to expect the federal
courts to implement "federal law" so as to achieve uniformity
of treatment of both plaintiffs and defendants.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has flatly ruled that
state law and only state law governs as to all "outcome-deter-
minative" issues in regard to aviation litigation. 57 In fact, in
the litigation growing out of the DC-10 accident at O'Hare
Airport, American Airlines argued in regard to the prejudg-
ment interest issue, "It is a rule of long standing that federal
courts, sitting by virtue of their diversity jurisdiction, must
apply the applicable state decisional and statutory law as the
law exists, and not as the court or any of the parties might
prefer the law to be.""' 6 Chief Justice Warren Burger has re-
peatedly argued that the fiction of diversity of citizenship as a
basis for federal jurisdiction no longer has any purpose."59 It
would be the height of absurdity if cases filed in or removed
to the federal courts were to be tried with different "outcome-
determinative" rules on the basis of "federal common law" in
contrast to cases filed in the state courts arising out of the
same occurrence.
In Turcotte v. Ford Motor Company, 60 a wrongful death
case involving Rhode Island law, the defendants contended
1 Id..
NM Conklin, Aviation-Doubt in the Courthouse; Is the Federal Law Supreme or
Not?, 20 TIAL LAW. GUIDE 476, 480 (1976); Kennelly, Aviation Law: Domestic Air
Travel-A Brief Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56 Cm. B. REc. 248, 267-68 (1975).
'57 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633, 637
(7th Cir. 1981).
I Brief for American Airlines at 8, In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on
May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981).
59 Burger, Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association,
63 A.B.A. J. 504, 506 (1977).
1- 494 F.2d 172 (1st Cir. 1974).
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that the United States district court should have applied
Rhode Island law, which requires evidence of income taxes in
computing damages in wrongful death actions. 61 Obviously, a
plaintiff would prefer that the court apply a "federal law"
that income taxes should not be considered. 162 The First Cir-
cuit rejected the contention of the plaintiff and sustained the
position of the defendants, namely, that the federal court
must apply the state law which would have been applied if the
same case were pending in the state court rather than in the
federal court:
The 'twin aims' of the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins are
the discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of ineq-
uitable administration of the laws. Under Erie, a state rule
should be applied in a diversity case if it 'would have so impor-
tant an effect upon the fortunes of one or both litigants that
failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to
choose the federal court.' In the instant case, if Rhode Island
law required evidence of income taxes in computing wrongful
death damages, yet the federal district court in Rhode Island
barred such evidence in diversity cases, no rational plaintiff
who had the choice would ever bring a wrongful death action in
the state courts. The difference in wrongful death recoveries
between the two forums would be staggering. Therefore, under
Erie, state law must control.103
If the federal court were to sanction the admissibility of evi-
dence relating to income taxes and also were to require the
Liepelt1 ' 4 type of negative instruction, warning the jury as to
exemption of wrongful death awards from taxation, every
plaintiff would make every effort to stay out of the federal
courts. The federl courts would be inundated with motions to
remand.
The federal district court in litigation arising out of the
O'Hare Airport air crash recognized the need to comply with
the admonitions of the United States Supreme Court that fo-
" Id. at 185.
162 Id.
"' Id. (citations omitted).
'" Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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rum-shopping is to be discouraged:
[Olur decision that the issues raised by the parties' motions in
limine are to be resolved by application of Illinois law rests
upon the 'realization that it would be unfair for the character
or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had
been brought in a federal court.' That Erie's policies of dis-
couraging forum-shopping and avoiding inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws serve as a better touchstone than does a
simple 'substantive-procedural' dichotomy is persuasively
demonstrated in the First Circuit's opinion in Turcotte v. Ford
Motor Co.16'
The O'Hare Airport DC-10 air crash litigation supplies a note-
worthy example of the chaotic condition of the law which
would result if the federal court were to apply "federal law" in
a manner so as to bring about vastly different results as to
either plaintiffs or defendants, in contrast to suits brought in
state court arising out of the same occurrence.
III. CONCLUSION
Uniform legislation is required in order to alleviate, at least
to some extent, the confusion and contradictions which per-
meate the law pertaining to tort litigation arising out of air-
plane crashes involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants.
Such uniform legislation should apply to all types of aviation
accidents. It should:
1. Provide for uniform rules pertaining to the rights of de-
fendants to contribution based upon comparative negligence.
2. Provide uniform criteria for the determination of com-
105 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 526 F. Supp. 226,
232 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that evidence of the impact of income taxes upon earn-
ings of a decedent and an instruction advising the jury that its verdict was free from
taxes were precluded by Illinois law. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, on February 15, 1983, reversed the district court and ruled that evi-
dence of the effect of income taxes upon earnings was admissible, and that the dis-
trict court should give the Liepelt- type instruction to the jurors, advising that their
verdict would not be subject to income taxes. This opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals is reported at 701 F.2d 1189 (1983). This author has filed a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No.
82-2129).
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pensatory damages, particularly relating to wrongful death
cases. The prescribed critieria of damages should include,
with regard to compensatory damages, those elements which
are necessary to the rendition of justice to claimants.
3. Provide for the appearance at the trial of any employee
of any party to the suit, regardless of place of residence, sub-
ject to the rule that there be no harrassment of any litigant's
employees.
4. Provide that any insurer of an alleged tortfeasor which
carries on business in any state should be subject to suit in
that state. This would eliminate the absurd situation of hav-
ing to sue different defendants in different states.1"
5. Provide that a defendant or potential defendant may set-
tle in good faith with claimants without being subjected to
claims for contribution, but permit the settling defendant to
seek contribution from nonsettling defendants.
6. Provide for either uniform rules as to the type of proof
required to obtain punitive damages and who should receive
such damages, or eliminate claims for punitive damages as to
both injury and death cases.1'7 There is a manifest need for
uniform laws pertaining to aviation litigation. New and dy-
namic laws, followed by real-life implementation, are urgently
required in the interests of both the passenger public and the
aircraft industry. The Congress of the United States should
not attempt to enact utopian legislation providing "national
uniformity of relief" in regard to a limited type of aviation
accident claims.' 6" Note that the proposed federal legislation
is probably unconstitutional. A fundamental tenet of constitu-
'" See supra text accompanying notes 87-8.
'67 The present system makes no sense in that some states permit punitive dam-
ages in both death and injury cases, while other states allow such damages only in
injury cases. See generally 11 Am. JUR. 2D Death § 136 (1965). Some states require
proof of egregious conduct at a managerial level. Other states impose vicarious liabil-
ity upon companies for the egregious conduct of their non-mangerial employees even
though their wrongful conduct is not authorized or ratified by their employers. Some
states forbid insuring against punitive damages. Others permit such insurance. See
generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
" See, e.g., Dombroff, Against a Federal Law for Air Disaster Litigation, 10 THE
BRIEF 30 (1981); Haskell, Federal Regulation Not Needed for Airline Liability, 10
THE BRIEF 26 (1981).
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tional law is that legislation which singles out one segment of
an industry for preferential treatment must not be arbitrary
and must have a rational basis.1 O
The world has been transformed in little more than a gener-
ation, catapulted from the horse and buggy to conventional
jetliners, supersonic and soon hypersonic air travel, and the
space age. The legal profession throughout the world simply
has not kept up with these massive alterations. It has been
said that lawyers have, in effect, painted themselves into a
corner. Society views lawyers as technicians, practicing a
rather esoteric craft of small value. Others state that some
lawyers are irrelevant, even obsolescent. Those attorneys or
representatives who remain polarized in their viewpoints on
behalf of passengers, airlines, manufacturers, the federal gov-
ernment, or other segments of the aviation industry, and who
take unrealistic, biased viewpoints which seek discriminatory
treatment for their clients' particular interests, should realize
that the passenger public and all segments of the industry are
entitled to fair treatment consistent with the economic well-
being of the entire aircraft industry, as well as just treatment
of injured passengers who are killed.
Compromise and common sense are needed so that the ad-
versary system can be retained and still work. The way to
keep the system is not to blindly tell one another at seminars
and bar meetings how well the system is working. The answer
is to face up to the deficiencies in the system and for lawyers
to lead the way in the enactment of remedial legislation, by
utilizing traditional methods which have been proven effec-
tive, i.e., the passage of uniform statutes by state legislatures.
Examples of well-drafted uniform state laws include the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Uniform Probate Act. The
problems cannot be entrusted to Congress. The cure will be
worse than the sickness.
There are three officially appointed commissioners from
each jurisdiction (all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
189 See Morgane y. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see also Grasse
v. Dealers Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952); Harvey v. Clyde Park
District, 32 Il.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965). Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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Puerto Rico and most United States territories), plus a few
life members.17 0 The commissioners meet annually at the
same place as the American Bar Association and record their
activities in their own handbook.17 ' No doubt the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will call upon the ex-
pertise of a large number of representatives of the aircraft in-
dustry, the Justice Department, experienced aviation lawyers
and judges in order to bring about genuine, workable, and just
reform. It must be obvious by now that the Congress of the
United States does not possess the capacity to enact legisla-
tion which will rectify the problems which indisputably need
corrective action in aviation accident litigation. H.R. 1027172
and the Air Travel Protection Act 7 3 are examples of the in-
ability of Congress to deal adequately with this problem. In
the past, resolutions in conflicting state laws have resulted
from careful and prudent action of the National Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws. Almost every knowledgeable ob-
server of aviation law realizes the need for uniform laws. The
way to get them is through the action of the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and not as a result of Con-
gressional intervention.
The bottom line is that uniform legislation clearly is
needed. The aviation bar must lead the way by recommending
that H.R. 1027 and the Air Travel Protection Act not be en-
acted or adopted. At the same time, it must propose workable
and just legislation to the National Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. Lawyers who are opposed to change and re-
form in the law of aviation accident litigation are akin to den-
tists who are opposed to fluoride and doctors who are opposed
to penicillin.
17O Leflar, Maurice H. Merrill and Uniform State Law, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 501
(1972).
" Note, Uniformity in the Law-The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 19 MoNT. L.REv. 149, 153 (1958).
17 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
' ' See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
